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Abstract
Research Summary: Prior crisis-response literature
outlines zones of conformity (i.e., response meets stake-
holder expectations), underconformity (i.e., response
falls short of expectations), and overconformity (i.e.,
response exceeds expectations). We utilize a mixed-
method approach to empirically test the impact of dif-
ferent response strategies on customers (Study 1: exper-
iment) and investors (Study 2: event study). We not
only find empirical support that a conforming strategy
outperforms both nonconforming strategies concerning
stakeholders' affective evaluations of reputation, but
extend this proposition to stakeholders' cognitive evalu-
ations of reputation and the financial implications for
the firm. The most counterintuitive finding is that over-
conforming strategies result in lower firm reputation
and stock returns relative to conforming strategies.
Thus, exceeding stakeholder expectations during a cri-
sis can have unintended negative consequences.
Managerial Summary: How should firms react to
product recalls? Previous research suggests that exceed-
ing expectations of external stakeholders should have a
neutral or even positive impact on firm reputation and
financial performance, while falling short of expecta-
tions should have a negative impact. In this article, we
test the impact of different product recall strategies.
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The most counterintuitive finding is that exceeding
stakeholder expectations during a product crisis can
have unintended negative consequences on both cus-
tomers and investors.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
A crisis is an “unexpected, publicly known, and harmful event that has high levels of initial
uncertainty, interferes with the normal operations of an organization, and generates wide-
spread, intuitive, and negative perceptions among evaluators” (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015: p. 345).
A firm's crisis-response strategy that meets or exceeds expectations of external stakeholders
should have a neutral or even positive impact on their evaluations of the firm, while falling
short of expectations should have a negative impact (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Gray & Bal-
mer, 1998; Philippe & Durand, 2011). In their conceptual piece, Bundy and Pfarrer (2015; here-
after: B&P), based on Coombs' situational crisis communication theory (e.g., Coombs, 2007),
categorize potential crisis-response strategies into three general groups: underconforming (i.e.,
response falls short of expectations), conforming (i.e., response meets expectations), and over-
conforming (i.e., response exceeds expectations). B&P argue that social approval loss is lowest
for conforming strategies. While it is intuitive that conforming (underconforming) has a neutral
or positive (negative) impact on external stakeholders' evaluations of the firm, B&P develop the
counterintuitive idea that overconforming could create negative consequences for firms.
To date, there is no empirical evidence for B&P's main proposition and how these strat-
egies shape evaluators' perceptions of the firm. We close this gap and offer the following
two extensions. First, we utilize a two-component conceptualization of reputation (Raithel
& Schwaiger, 2015) that captures both the intuitive and affective aspects (as discussed by
B&P) as well as the deliberate and analytical aspects of reputation. Second, in addition to
firm reputation, we also utilize stock returns to understand the financial impact of B&P's
main proposition.
2 | THE CRISIS-RESPONSE MATCH THEORY
According to B&P's framework, stakeholders evaluate firm crises based on two primary factors:
situational attributions (low vs. high) and a firm's response strategy (more defensive vs. more
accommodative). Situational attributions refer to “the perceived degree of an organization's
responsibility based on the characteristics of the crisis” (p. 346), such as “its perceived intention-
ality, controllability, and severity” (p. 351), while a firm's response strategy refers to “the set of
coordinated communication and actions used to influence evaluators' crisis perceptions”
(p. 346). Based on these two factors, B&P derive their proposed crisis-response match, and argue
that in order to reduce social approval loss, “a crisis with higher situational attributions of
responsibility should be matched with a response strategy that accepts more responsibility, and
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a crisis with lower situational attributions of responsibility should be matched with a response
strategy that accepts less responsibility” (p. 352).
Conforming strategies match higher (lower) situational attributions of responsibility with a
response strategy that accepts more (less) responsibility. As B&P argue, both conforming strate-
gies are more likely to create cognitive consonance, and external stakeholders are not only more
likely to agree with a firm's response, but also less likely to alter their initial judgments about
the firm (Nickerson, 1998; Traut-Mattausch, Shulz-Hardt, Greitemeyer, & Frey, 2004; Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974). Further, conforming strategies are more likely to satisfy external stake-
holders' normative expectations. For crises with higher situational attributions and perceived
responsibility, a firm's acceptance of more responsibility satisfies social expectations of justice,
sincerity, and fairness (Coombs, 2007; Dean, 2004; Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008;
Tyler, 1997) and can support perceptions of competence and likeability (Lee, Peterson, &
Tiedens, 2004). For crises with lower situational attributions and perceived responsibility, evalu-
ators typically have lower normative expectations of a firm. Thus, a strategy that accepts less
responsibility is appropriate for such crises.
Nonconforming strategies either underconform by accepting less responsibility than evalua-
tors expected, or overconform by accepting more. Both nonconforming strategies, as B&P argue,
challenge stakeholders' initial perceptions of a crisis and trigger cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1962; Pratt, 2000), which in turn increases information search (Ashforth, Harrison,
& Corley, 2008; Elliot & Devine, 1994) that can lead to the conclusion that a firm's response
was careless, inaccurate, wrong, or even deceitful (Benoit, 1995; Dean, 2004; Elsbach, 2003;
Pfarrer et al., 2008). Further, “evaluators' attribution biases (i.e., confirmation bias and anchor-
ing bias) can lead them to resist an underconforming or overconforming mismatched strategy”
(B&P, 2015: p. 356). While it is not surprising that an underconforming strategy can cause nega-
tive judgments, it seems counterintuitive that an overconforming strategy can do the same.
Although exceeding expectations is usually a positive signal, external stakeholders might
become suspicious and wonder why a firm is accepting more crisis responsibility than it needs
to. Is the potential damage/hazard much bigger than expected? The anchoring bias (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) ensures that lower initial attributions are not easily changed by the over-
conforming response. Instead, it raises other concerns, such as is the firm insincere,
overreaching, or hiding anything? As B&P argue, looking for such counterfactuals to reduce/
eliminate the dissonance might result in more negative judgments by evaluators (Ashforth &
Gibbs, 1990).
3 | EXTENDING THE CRISIS-RESPONSE MATCH THEORY
First, B&P only theorize about the effects of the crisis-response match on evaluators' percep-
tions of social approval. They define social approval as an intuitive and affective construct,
which captures the “perception of general affinity toward an organization” (p. 347). B&P argue
that social approval is different from perceptions of organizational reputation, which they
define as a deliberate and analytical construct that captures the “assessment of an organiza-
tion's ability to deliver value” (p. 347). B&P's conceptualizations of social approval and reputa-
tion do, however, reflect the two-component conceptualization of corporate reputation (e.g.,
Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015) that captures external evaluators' perceptions of a firm's abilities
(“competence”) and their affinity toward the firm (“likeability”). B&P acknowledge this two-
component view on reputation (p. 347) and the inherent overlap between their
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conceptualization of social approval and reputation (p. 348: footnote 2). Therefore, we extend
B&P's main proposition by applying it to the two-component conceptualization of reputation.
Second, B&P acknowledge the missing focus on the financial implications of the crisis-
response match. On the one hand, financial performance is directly related to firm reputation
(e.g., Raithel & Schwaiger, 2015; Robert & Dowling, 1997). Hence, conforming responses could
outperform nonconforming responses financially. On the other hand, different response strate-
gies involve different financial costs for the firm (Liu, Liu, & Luo, 2016), and investors might
evaluate the financial net effect of the crisis-response match differently. Therefore, in addition
to examining the impact of B&P's main proposition on firm reputation, we also analyze stock
returns to gain insights into the financial consequences of the different response strategies.
We utilize a mixed-method approach to empirically test B&P's crisis-response match and
the two proposed extensions. Study 1 (experiment) manipulates situational attributions and
firm response in a controlled environment and examines customer response by using a two-
component view on reputation as the dependent measure. In Study 2 (event study) we draw on
observational data and analyze investor response by using abnormal returns as the dependent
measure. This two-study design allows us to assess the generalizability of B&P's prediction to
different stakeholder groups and performance outcomes that cannot be addressed through one
data source alone (Davis, Golicic, & Boerstler, 2011; Hamilton, 2016).
4 | RESEARCH CONTEXT: PRODUCT RECALLS
We use a product recall context to test B&P's conceptual framework empirically. First, product
recalls are one of the most frequent firm crises and can even threaten a firm's existence (e.g.,
Japanese airbag manufacturer Takata went bankrupt after a major recall; CNN, 2017). Second,
and most importantly, for many industries product recalls are regulated by the Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission (CPSC), and therefore offer standardized data, which enable the com-
parison of empirical results from the field with those of experiments. In short, CPSC's basic
product recall process is as follows. CPSC releases a standardized recall announcement together
with the affected firm if CPSC, the firm, a consumer, or any other supply chain member iden-
tifies a significant product hazard.1 The primary two objectives of any recall are to (a) locate
and remove defective products as quickly as possible and (b) “communicate accurate and
understandable information in a timely manner to the public about the product defect, the haz-
ard, and the corrective action” (CPSC, 2012: p. 18).
4.1 | Study 1: The crisis-response match and customer response
4.1.1 | Participants, method, and design
Five hundred and sixty-nine U.S. based adults (Mage = 37.34, 61% female) completed this survey
for a small payment through the TurkPrime application (Litman, Robinson, &
Abberbock, 2017). This study employed a two (situational attributions: low = external cause vs.
high = internal cause) × 2 (firm response: accept vs. deny responsibility) between subjects
design with random assignment, plus a control group. Participants read the recall of a
1For a detailed explanation of CPSC's recall process, see Chen, Ganesan, and Liu (2009).
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smartphone producer, which we tailored to their specific smartphone brand to increase involve-
ment. After reading about the recall, we first manipulated situational attributions. In the low
[high] situational attributions condition, participants read a brief newspaper excerpt in which
the firm blamed their supplier [internal testing], and we assessed participants' situational attri-
butions (I believe that [X] had the power to control the product failure/[X] intentionally sold
the malfunctioning product/the product malfunction is a severe event; α = .481).2 After that, we
manipulated firm response. In the accept [deny] responsibility condition, participants read
another brief newspaper excerpt in which the firm accepted full [denied any] responsibility. In
the control condition, participants only read the initial recall announcement, see Web Appendix
A for more study details.
Next, participants rated their brand's post-recall reputation, which served as dependent vari-
able. We used a measure from Raithel and Schwaiger (2015), which consists of six 7-point
Likert scales and captures both people's perceptions of a firm's abilities (“competence”) and
their feelings about the firm (“likeability”). Sample items include “[X] is a top competitor in its
market” (competence) and “I regard [X] as a likeable company” (likeability). The extracted fac-
tor shows a good fit (AVE = 0.657, α = .880). Lastly, participants indicated how old their phone
was, how much it cost, and provided demographics. We thanked and debriefed participants to
prevent carry-over effects from the experiment to actual brand perceptions.
In order to ensure high data quality, we included three manipulation checks and partici-
pants were immediately brought to the end of the survey if they answered any of them incor-
rectly. First, after the recall announcement, we asked what the product hazard was
(overheating only, burn hazard, burn and fire hazard, choking, laceration). Second, after the sit-
uational attributions manipulation, we asked who the firm blamed for the hazardous batteries
(internal testing, supplier, article did not specify). Third, after the firm response manipulation,
we asked if the firm accepted responsibility for the recall (yes, no, article did not specify).
4.1.2 | Results
Equivalence of groups
ANOVAs revealed that the five groups did not differ with regard to the age (p = .791) or price of
the phone (p = .648), or participants' age (p = .983) or gender (p = .577), suggesting that the five
groups (Ninternal × accept = 100, Ninternal × deny = 91, Nexternal × accept = 119, Nexternal × deny = 111,
Ncontrol = 148)
3 were by and large comparable.
Situational attributions
A successful manipulation satisfies two criteria: First, both internal conditions should yield
higher situational attributions than both external conditions. Second, both internal conditions
should not differ from each other and both external conditions should not differ from each
other either. This is exactly what we find. Most importantly, both internal conditions (inter-
nal × accept: 0.134; internal × deny: 0.137) yield higher situational attributions than both exter-
nal conditions (external × accept: −0.128; external × deny: −0.128). The effect difference
between the two internal and the two external conditions is significant (F[1, 419] = 7.238,
2The lower alpha can be explained by the fact that the first item is affected by the situational attribution manipulation,
but the other two items are not. Our effects get even stronger when we only include the first item.
3Group sizes differ because of the three manipulation checks described earlier.
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p = .006, d = 0.269), while there is no difference between the two internal (F[1, 189] = 0.001,
p = .982, d = 0.003) and the two external conditions (F[1, 228] = 0.000, p = .998, d = 0.001).
Therefore, our manipulation of situational attributions was successful. In order to provide a
complete picture of all conditions, we also compared the control condition with the two internal
and external conditions. The effect difference between the two internal conditions and the con-
trol condition (−0.068) is marginally significant (F[1, 337] = 3.714, p = .055, d = 0.209), while
there is no difference between the two external conditions and the control condition (F[1,
376] = 0.314, p = .576, d = 0.060). Next, we discuss how firm responses (accept vs. deny) impact
perceptions of post-recall reputation once these situational attributions are formed.
Reputation (aggregate)
A successful test of B&P's main proposition entails two main findings. First, both conforming
conditions should yield higher situational attributions than both nonconforming conditions.
Second, both conforming conditions should not differ from each other and both nonconforming
conditions should not differ from each other either. This is exactly what we find. Figure 1a dis-
plays the group means of the z-standardized post-recall reputation factor score for the five dif-
ferent groups. Most importantly, both conforming conditions (internal × accept (C1): 0.328;
external × deny (C2): 0.157) yield a higher post-recall reputation than the two nonconforming
conditions (internal × deny (UC): −0.290; external × accept (OC): −0.154). The effect difference
between the two conforming and the two nonconforming strategies is significant (F[1,
419] = 24.859, p = .000, d = 0.486), while there is no difference between the two conforming (F
[1, 209] = 2.200, p = .140, d = 0.204) and the two nonconforming conditions (F[1, 208] = 0.918,
p = .339, d = 0.132). Therefore, we find support for B&P's main proposition. In order to provide
a complete picture of all conditions, we also compared the control condition with the two con-
forming and nonconforming conditions. The effect difference between the two conforming con-
ditions and the control condition (0.049; (F[1, 357] = 3.955, p = .047, d = 0.211), and for the two
nonconforming conditions and the control condition is significant (F[1, 356] = 6.140, p = .014,
d = 0.266).
Competence
These reputation effects replicate for the competence factor. Figure 1b (black bars) displays the
group means of the z-standardized factor score. Most importantly, both conforming conditions
(internal × accept (C1): 0.237; external × deny (C2): 0.207) yield a higher post-recall compe-
tence than nonconforming conditions (internal × deny (UC): −0.204; external × accept (OC):
−0.125). The effect difference between the two conforming and the two nonconforming strate-
gies is significant (F[1, 419] = 17.373, p = .000, d = 0.407), while there is no significant differ-
ence between the two conforming (F[1, 209] = 0.063, p = .802, d = 0.036) and the two
nonconforming conditions (F[1, 208] = 0.303, p = .583, d = 0.176). The effect difference
between the two conforming conditions and the control condition is significant (−0.001; (F[1,
357] = 5.185, p = .023, d = 0.238), while there is no difference between the two nonconforming
conditions and the control condition (F[1, 356] = 2.108, p = .147, d = 0.158).
Likeability
These reputation effects also replicate for the likeability factor (see gray bars in Figure 1b). Most
importantly, both conforming conditions (internal × accept (C1): 0.349; external × deny (C2):
0.093) yield a higher post-recall likeability than the two nonconforming conditions (inter-
nal × deny (UC): −0.312; external × accept (OC): −0.153). The effect difference between the
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two conforming and the two nonconforming conditions is significant (F[1, 419] = 22.734,
p = .000, d = 0.461), and there is a significant difference between the two conforming condi-
tions (F[1, 209] = 4.662, p = .032, d = 0.302), while there is no difference between the two non-
conforming conditions (F[1, 208] = 1.286, p = .258, d = 0.158). The effect difference between
the two conforming conditions and the control condition is not significant (0.082; (F[1,
357] = 1.931, p = .165, d = 0.145), while there is a difference between the two nonconforming
conditions and the control condition (F[1, 356] = 8.520, p = .004, d = 0.301).
4.1.3 | Discussion
We find empirical support for B&P's main proposition: post-recall reputation is higher for
conforming strategies than for under- and overconforming strategies. This finding holds for
the affective as well as cognitive aspects of reputation. The goal of the next study is to extend
B&P's proposition to a financial context by identifying the financial implications of the cri-




FIGURE 1 (a) Impact of crisis-response match on aggregate reputation measure (Study 1). Note: Reputation is
measured as z-standardized factor score of the six reputation items. Scores can only be interpreted relative to each
other but not in absolute terms. (b) Impact of crisis-response match on competence and likeability (Study 1). Note:
Competence [Likeability] is measured as z-standardized factor score of the three competence [likeability] items.
Scores can only be interpreted relative to each other but not in absolute terms
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4.2 | Study 2: The crisis-response match and investor response
4.2.1 | Mapping the field data onto B&P's framework
The standardized CPSC data does not contain explicit information about situational attributions
(i.e., internal vs. external cause) and whether firms accept or deny any responsibility. In Study 2
(event study), we therefore use the two implicit factors, timing (reactive vs. proactive) and rem-
edy (partial vs. full), as proxies. Although these proxies do not fully reflect stakeholders' percep-
tions about situational attributions and firms' acceptance of responsibility, timing and remedy
do map onto B&P's two core dimensions of their theoretical framework, and implicitly provide
evaluators with important cues about the nature of and responsibility for the crisis.
First, Chen et al. (2009) classify recall strategies as either proactive or reactive. Proactive
(reactive) recalls occur early (much later) in the process and are often triggered through inter-
nal inspections (external complaints) and before any (after at least one) consumer safety inci-
dent has been reported to the firm or CPSC. A proactive firm voluntarily discloses information
about a product malfunction, approaches the authorities directly, and wants to remove/repair
defective products as quickly as possible (p. 216). Thus, by avoiding consumer safety incidents,
a proactive firm could reduce situational attributions about crisis severity and intentionality
compared to a reactive firm, which has been either incompetent at discovering, or has inten-
tionally concealed the product malfunction until consumer safety incidents became public.
Consequently, and all else being equal, situational attributions and accompanying perceived
responsibility should be lower (higher) for proactive (reactive) recalls.
Second, Liu et al. (2016) classify firm responses as either partial or full remedy, and firms
can freely choose between the two. A firm's decision to offer partial or full remedy as compensa-
tion contributes to stakeholders' perception of the firm's stand on its crisis responsibility. “As
crisis response strategies become more accommodative, (…) stakeholders perceive the organiza-
tion as taking greater responsibility for the crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2004, 2005)”
(Coombs, 2007; p. 170). Partial remedies (e.g., discount for future purchase or do-it-yourself
repair kits) signal a more defensive response and indicate that a firm accepts less responsibility,
because they either do not fully compensate customers or customers are expected to fix the mal-
function themselves. Full remedies (e.g., full refund or free repair/replacement) signal a more
accommodative response, because customers either receive all of their money back or the firm
provides them with a new/repaired product. Thus, full remedies take on more responsibility
because the firm incurs a higher compensation cost (Liu et al., 2016: p. 81).
In our context, a conforming strategy could offer either (a) full remedy (accepts more respon-
sibility; Coombs, 2007; Liu et al., 2016) for a reactive recall (higher situational attributions and
perceived responsibility; Chen et al., 2009) or (b) partial remedy (accepts less responsibility;
Coombs, 2007; Liu et al., 2016) for a proactive recall (lower situational attributions and per-
ceived responsibility; Chen et al., 2009). Nonconforming strategies either underconform (partial/
reactive) by accepting less responsibility than evaluators expected, or overconform (full/proac-
tive) by accepting more responsibility (see Web Appendix B).
4.2.2 | Data sources and sample
We analyze CPSC product recalls from January 1996 to December 2014. Each recall
announcement includes the exact recall date, product details, hazard, remedy, incidents and
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injuries, number of units recalled, time frame during which the product has been sold, and
price. CPSC does not allow any news releases before the official recall announcement. This
enabled us to pinpoint the event date. Both the announcement and the firm's recall strategy
are not anticipated by the public, which is the ideal setting for an event study. We obtained
daily stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for product recalls
of publicly traded firms (NYSE or NASDAQ). Similar to Chen et al. (2009), we excluded all
retailer recalls (e.g., Walmart) and focused only on manufacturer recalls, because CPSC regu-
lations differ between these two groups. CPSC's product recall announcement serves as the
event and the announcement date serves as the event day (Day 0). Our final sample consists




We apply the Fama and French Four-Factor Model (Carhart, 1997; Fama & French, 1993) and
regress each firm's stock returns on the market, size, value, and momentum factor over the esti-
mation period t = −255 to t = −11, relative to the event day t = 0:
Rit−RRFt=αi+βi RMRFt+si SMBt+hi HMLt+ui UMDt+εit, ð1Þ
where Rit is the stock return i on day t. RRFt is the risk-free rate of return on day t. RMRFt is
the risk-free adjusted market return on day t. SMBt is the difference between small and large
stock returns on day t, HMLt between high and low book-to-market stock returns on day t,
and UMDt between stock returns with an upward and downward momentum factor. εit refers
to the error term of stock i on day t, and αi is the intercept. The four slope estimates βi, si, hi,
and ui measure the sensitivity of stock i's risk-free adjusted return to the four risk factors. We
focus on the cumulative abnormal returns, CAR, for the event window t = −1, capturing infor-
mation breaches and insider trading, to t = +1, capturing delay if investors use only follow-up
information, such as news tickers picking up the CPSC announcement. CAR (−1,+1) is
defined as the sum of the differences between actual and expected stock returns on days
t = −1, 0, +1.
CPSC provides objective information about the Firm Response. In line with Chen
et al. (2009), we code a response strategy as reactive (proactive) if incidents/injuries have
(not) occurred. Following Liu et al. (2016), we classify firm responses as either partial or full
remedy. Combining both codes we categorize firm responses as either (a) conforming (C1:
reactive/full or C2: proactive/partial), (b) underconforming (UC: reactive/partial), or (c) over-
conforming (OC: proactive/full). For instance, in 2014, Emerson Electric Co. recalled 3.7 mil-
lion travel charger kits with a loose wire that posed an electrocution hazard. They issued the
recall after receiving 300 reports of injuries (= reactive), and offered free replacement (= full
remedy), making it a conforming (C1) firm response (Table 1 lists examples for C1, C2, UC,
and OC).
4A Factiva search for each recall yielded 12 concurring events, such as quarterly earnings announcements, which might
have overshadowed the impact of the recall. Thus, we performed all analyses with the reduced set of observations. Our
findings are robust to these events. Results for the reduced sample can be obtained upon request.
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4.2.4 | Correction for observed self-selection and omitted variable bias
Firms do not randomly choose their recall strategy. For example, firms might be more likely to
offer full instead of partial remedy if the product hazard is high versus low. Further, as B&P
argue, managers of higher and lower approval firms may accept less crisis responsibility than
average approval firms (proposition 4, p. 362). Both variables might also shape investors'
response to the product recall.5 Accordingly, the estimate for the relationship between the cri-
sis-response match and investor response is biased if this self-selection remains unac-
counted for.
We set up a model that corrects the potential outcome (here: stock returns) in such a way
that the observed covariates, which are correlated with the treatment (here: response strategy),
do not affect the potential outcome anymore. Based on prior literature (e.g., B&P, Chen
et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2016), we include important covariates into the model including hazard,
reputation, financial risk (value of recalled products relative to the total revenue), product sell
time, recall experience, product category, media coverage of the recall, firm size, profitability,
and liability. These covariates can have an impact on response strategy and investor response,
and thus have to be controlled for. Web Appendix C describes these covariates. To estimate the
multivalued average treatment effects (here: underconforming, conforming, and over-
conforming), Cattaneo (2010) proposes the semiparametric efficient-influence estimator, which
has the double-robust property (Wooldridge, 2010).6 In stage one, this procedure estimates two
models which give (a) for each observation the predicted probabilities for the three treatment
statuses to control for self-selection effect on firm response and (b) the conditional outcome
means to control for the covariates' effects on investor response. These first stage models
include the control covariates mentioned above (for more details, see Web Appendix C). This
first stage estimation procedure ensures that the three treatment groups are comparable and
that the relationship between treatment statuses and outcome is independent of the covariates.
In stage two, the treatment effect model then describes the bias corrected relationship between
firm response and stock returns. Since we lack a “true” control group, i.e., firms which did not
select in either treatment condition, the estimation procedure will produce a Local Average
Treatment Effect (LATE).
TABLE 1 Examples of conforming and nonconforming firm responses (Study 2)
Group Firm Product Hazard Injuries Remedy




Electrocution 300 Free replacement
C2 (proactive/partial) Steelcase Inc. Desk chair Fall 0 Free adhesive
cover repair kit




OC (proactive/full) Reebok Sneaker Choking 0 Full refund
5For example, B&P discuss the endowment effect, whereby “higher and lower levels of social approval [reputation] act
as either a buffer or a burden to modify evaluators’ crisis perceptions and attributions” (p. 362).
6Cattaneo, Drukker, and Holland (2013) discuss technical details and an implementation of this estimator in Stata.
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4.2.5 | Results
Self-selection/omitted variable bias unadjusted results
Figure 2 shows that conforming strategies (C1: −0.12%, CI 95% (−5.41%, 5.80%), N = 284; C2:
1.51%, CI 95% (−1.04%, 4.52%), N = 10) receive more positive CARs than under- (UC: −0.95%,
CI 95% [−8.41%, 2.78%], N = 55) and overconforming (OC: −0.70%, CI 95% [−5.71%, 3.49%],
N = 94) strategies. A heteroscedasticity-robust Welch-test indicates that group differences are
very likely (W-test [3, 43.65] = 4.681, p = .006). The relatively wide confidence intervals of the
four groups might raise concerns about the influence of outliers. We therefore winsorize the
variable CAR(−1,+1) at the 95% confidence interval.7 Further, since proactive/partial strategies
(C2) only account for about 2% in our sample (10 events), we combine this group with reactive/
full (C1) for all subsequent analyses to represent conforming strategies.8 The three resulting
treatment groups are also very likely to have different CARs (W-test [2, 131.30] =
3.132, p = .047).
Self-selection/omitted variable bias adjusted results
Table 2 summarizes the multivalued treatment model results and provides two important
insights. First, this model estimates the potential outcome for each treatment group. The poten-
tial outcome mean is negative for under- (−0.931%, p = .001) and overconforming (−0.747%,
p = .003) groups, whereas it is not different from zero for the conforming group (−0.037%,
p = .814). Second, the model provides information about treatment group differences. Con-
forming responses yield more positive CARs compared to under- (0.895%, p = .004) and over-
conforming (0.710%, p = .016) responses. Under- and overconforming responses do not have
different CARs (−0.184%, p = .617).
Robustness check
The two-stage analysis might be insufficient to remedy the self-selection bias because firm
responses do not result from a random assignment to all four conditions of the crisis-response
FIGURE 2 The crisis-response match and cumulative abnormal stock returns (Study 2)
7Results for outlier unadjusted data are qualitatively similar and replicate the outlier adjusted findings reported below.
Results are available upon request.
8A small sample adjusted nonparametric test shows that CARs are unlikely to differ between conforming groups
(χ2(1) = 0.932, p > .10), whereby this merging does not introduce bias.
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match matrix (Web Appendix B). Therefore, we conducted an additional experiment via Ama-
zon's Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned participants (Mage = 36.39, 52% female) to one of
the four conditions: C1 (reactive/full), C2 (proactive/partial), UC (reactive/partial), and OC
(proactive/full). In short, the additional experiment replicates the findings of the event study
and, also in line with Study 1, suggests that both under- and overconforming strategies yield
lower perceptions of reputation by external evaluators than conforming strategies (see Web
Appendix D for all study details).
4.2.6 | Discussion
We find empirical support that under- and overconforming firms would have had higher CARs
if they had adopted a conforming strategy. Hence, this finding does not only replicate Study 1
and thus provides evidence for B&P's main proposition, but it also extends B&P's prediction to
the financial effects of the crisis-response match. Further, Study 2 also shows that this effect is
robust not only with regard to explicit but also to implicit informational cues about situational
attribution and firms' willingness to accept crisis responsibility.
5 | GENERAL DISCUSSION
B&P (2015) provide a theoretical framework for optimal crisis-response strategies. Based on sit-
uational attributions and a firm's response strategy, they outline zones of conformity,
TABLE 2 Local average treatment effects (Study 2)
Group 1 2 3
Firm response Underconforming Conforming Overconforming
N 55 294 94






p-Value .001 .814 .003
LATEa,b (%) p-Value 95% CI lo 95% CI hi
Conforming vs. Underconforming 0.895 (0.312) .004 0.284 1.505
Conforming vs. Overconforming 0.710 (0.294) .016 0.001 1.286
Underconforming vs. Overconforming −0.184 (0.369) .617 −0.907 0.539
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Covariates for modeling predicted probabilities
(to control for covariates' effects on firm response): Hazard, Reputation, Hazard*Reputation,
Reputation*Reputation, Hazard*Reputation*Reputation, Financial Risk. Covariates for modeling conditional out-
come means (to control for the observed covariates' effects on investor response): Hazard, Reputation,
Hazard*Reputation, Reputation*Reputation, Hazard*Reputation*Reputation, Financial Risk, Product Sell Time,
Recall Experience, Product categories Toy (binary), Child (binary), Sports (binary), Specialty (binary), Corporate
Brand (binary), Firm Size, Return on Sales, Liability, Media Coverage (−1,+1).
Abbreviation: CAR, cumulative abnormal stock return.
aOutlier adjusted results shown (outliers winsorized at the 95% confidence interval).
bLATE estimation based on efficient-influence-function (EIF) estimator with double-robust property (Cattaneo
et al., 2013).
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underconformity, and overconformity, and argue that social approval/reputation loss is lowest
for conforming strategies. The present study is the first to empirically test this main proposition.
We find empirical support for this proposition, that is, situational attributions and response
strategy must “match:” Conforming strategies outperform nonconforming strategies. We also
find support for B&P's most surprising and counterintuitive prediction: overconforming strate-
gies yield both lower firm reputation and stock returns relative to conforming strategies.
Although exceeding stakeholders' expectations is essential for building a superior reputation,
exceeding evaluators' (consumers' or investors') expectations during a crisis can have
unintended negative consequences.
We extend B&P's main proposition in two ways. First, we not only find that conforming
strategies outperform nonconforming strategies with regard to stakeholders' affective and intui-
tive evaluations (B&P call this social approval), but also with regard to cognitive and analytical
evaluations. By jeopardizing a firm's perceived competence and likeability, nonconforming
response strategies, including overconforming, pose a threat to a firm's reputation.
Second, while B&P do not differentiate between consumers and investors (i.e., they use the
term “evaluators”), we make this distinction and analyze the financial consequences of the cri-
sis-response match. The stock market punishes nonconforming strategies with a 0.5–1% reduc-
tion in market capitalization, which represents about $75 to $150 million for an S&P 500 stock
with median market capitalization. This observation also holds for overconforming strategies.
Investors are not only concerned about the financial costs of highly accommodative behavior in
the face of lower situational attributions, but also about the unclear motivation behind this
potentially overreaching and insincere response. Thus, it is essential for firms to clearly outline
their rationale for using overconforming strategies so that external evaluators will not initiate
counterfactual thinking and question the sincerity of the overconforming response. For under-
conforming strategies, which might involve lower financial costs in the short-term, investors
seem to take a more comprehensive and longer-term view. They balance potential benefits for
reputation and associated costs of this response strategy. Thus, firms should refrain from defen-
sive responses and focus on crisis resolution (Pfarrer et al., 2008), which ultimately benefits the
firm, its stakeholders, and society (B&P, 2015).
5.1 | Boundary conditions of the crisis-response match and future
research
In this research note, we focus on B&P's main Proposition 1. However, B&P also offer insights
into the boundary conditions of the crisis-response match. To test B&P's Propositions 2 and 3,
which state that firms with higher (Proposition 2) and lower (Proposition 3) social approval can
afford to offer more defensive response strategies, we conducted an additional experiment with
students of a large U.S. public university (Mage = 26.58, 66% female), see Web Appendix E for
all study details. In short, we find support for Proposition 2. Firms with high (vs. medium)
levels of pre-recall reputation can afford to offer more defensive response strategies. However,
we do not find support for Proposition 3, which suggests that firms with low (vs. medium) levels
of pre-recall reputation can afford to offer more defensive response strategies. In fact, we find
quite the opposite. Firms with low levels of pre-recall reputation can use product recalls to
improve their reputation. Although this finding contradicts B&P's prediction and sounds quite
paradoxical, prior research in the field of service failure management reports similar effects
(service recovery paradox; e.g., De Matos, Henrique, & Alberto Vargas Rossi, 2007): customers
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can have an even better opinion of the firm after a service failure if the firm handles the failure
unexpectedly well.
Since this paradox is at odds with B&P's rationale for Proposition 3, future studies could
examine B&P's Proposition 3 more theoretically and empirically. Moreover, B&P's Propositions
2 and 3 focus on a single boundary condition (pre-recall social approval/reputation). It is, how-
ever, very likely that other factors such as crisis type (e.g., performance- versus value-based mis-
conduct) have a moderating impact as well.
The secondary data for Study 2 (event study) allows us to also test B&P's final Proposition 4,
which states that managers of a higher or lower (vs. average) approval organization will be
more likely to accept less crisis responsibility. In short, we find that B&P's prediction holds only
for lower hazard product malfunctions, see Web Appendix F for all study details. Firms are less
likely to choose underconforming responses if the product hazard is high. However, if the prod-
uct hazard is low, managers of low and high reputation firms are (a) more likely to accept less
crisis responsibility and select more underconforming (vs. conforming) responses, and (b) more
likely to accept less crisis responsibility and not select overconforming (vs. conforming)
responses. This result points to a partial gap between actual and ideal decisions. To understand
the reasons for this gap, experiments and in-depth surveys could examine the psychological pro-
cesses of managerial decision making in times of crises.
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